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IT UATIOX III . 
DAYS OF GRACE. 
States X and l~ are at 'var. The 'var has broken out 
suddenly. State X proclaims that it 'vill allo'v to vessels 
of State Y "~ithin the ports of State X 48 hours in 'vhich 
to load and depart. State Y protests that this is not a 
reasonable dela~ defaveur, and that as State Y has allowed 
14 days for vessels of State X to depart, the vessels of 
State Y should be allo,ved a longer period than 48 hours, 
and also states that if a longer period is not allo,ved the 14-
day period 'vill be reduced. . 
(a) Is 48 hours a reasonable period~ 
(b ) Has State Y the right to shorten the period already 
proclaimed~ 
(c) Has State Y the right to 'vithdra'v all delai defaveur? 
SOLUTION. 
(a ) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a rea-
sonable limjt for delai de faveur. 
(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should 
be allo,ved to shorten the period 'vhieh it has already 
proclaimed to correspond 'vith the period granted by 
State X. 
(c) Under the conditions proposed in Situation III and 
having regard to the preamble of the Hague Convention 
on this subject, State Y has not the right to 'vithdraw all 
delai de faveur, though in an extreme case it may adopt 
the alternative of the Convention ·which requires enemy 
vessels to depart "immediately." 
NOTES. 
Early provisions for days of grace.-Provision 'vas made 
for days of grace in the treaty of Utrecht bet,veen Great 
Britain and France in 1713. 
ART. 27. On the contrary, it is agreed that whatever shall be 
found to be laden by the subjects and inhabitants of either party, in 
any ship belonging to the enemy of the other, and his subjects, the 
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whole, although it be not of the sort of prohibited goods, may be con-
fiscated, in the same manner as if it belonged to the enemy himself; 
except those goods and merchandises as were put on board such ship 
before the declaration of war, or even after such declaration, if so be it 
were done within the time and_ limits following; that is to say, if they 
were put on board such ship, in any port and place within the space of 
six weeks after such declaration, within the bounds called The Naze 
in Norway, and The Soundings; of two months, from The Soundings to 
the city of Gibraltar; of ten weeks, in the :Mediterranean Sea; and 9f 
eight months in any other country or place in the world; so that the 
goods of the subjects of either prince, whe"ther they be of the nature of 
such as are prohibited, or otherwise, which, as is aforesaid, were put on 
board any ship belonging to an enemy before the war, or after the dec-
laration of the same; within the time and limits abovesaid, shall no ways 
be liable to confiscation, but shall well and truly be restored without 
delay to the proprietors demanding the same; but so as that if the said 
merchandises be contraband, it shall not be any ways lawful to carry 
them afterwards to the ports belonging to (he enemy. (1 Chalmers Col-
lection of Treaties, p. 407.) 
Discussion of 1.906 .-Topic III of the International 
La 'v Topics discussed by the Naval \i\r ar College in 1906 
'vas as follo,~v-s: -
What regulations should be made in regard to the treatment of vessels 
of one belligerent bound for or within the ports of the other belligerent 
at the outbreak of war? 
The conclusion 'vas stated in the follo,ving form: 
1. Each State entering upon a war shall announce a date before which 
enemy vessels bound for or within its ports at the outbreak of war shall 
under ordinary conditions be allowed to enter, to discharge cargo, to 
load cargo, and to depart, without liability to capture while sailing 
directly to a permitted destination. If one belligerent State allows a 
shorter period than the other, the other State may, as a matter of right, 
reduce its period to correspond therewith. 
2. Each belligerent State may make such regulations in regard to 
sojourn, conduct, cargo, destination, and movements after departure 
of the innocent enemy vessels as may be deemed necessary to protect 
its military interests. 
3. A private vessel suitable for warlike use, belonging to one bellig-
erent and bound for or within the port of the other belligerent at the 
outbreak of war, is liable to be detained unless the government of the 
vessel's flag makes a satisfactory agreement that it shall not be put to 
any warlike use, in which case it may be accorded the same treatment 
as innocent enemy vessels._ 
The notes upon this topic, discussed in 1906, show the 
early origin of some form of days of grace. The practice 
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as to tin1e nllo,vecl enemy vessels to loaJ and depart has 
varied . At the time of the Spanish-.American \Var of 
1898 the United States allo,vecl 30 clays, Spain allo,vecl 
5 days. 1\t the time of the Russo-Japanese \Varin 1904, 
Russia allo,ved 48 hours and Japan allo,ved 10 clays. Six 
'veeks "·ere allo"·ed in some instances, as during the 
Crimean \var, and the Austro-Prussian \Var of 1866. 
\Vhile 6 "reeks \Vere allo,ved for enemy merchant 
vessels to load and depart in some of the \vars of the latter 
half of the 19th century, only 30 days \Yere allo,ved to 
Spanish vessels by the United States in 1898 and only 
10 days by Japan to Russian vessels in 1904. The 
United States regulations of 1898 \Vere held by the Su-
prenle Court to grant exemption fron1 capture to vessels 
that had sailed prior to the beginning of the "rar. 
Opinion of Prof. Takahashi.-Prof. Takahashi says: 
It may be stated with confidence that the days of grace of one week 1 
were sufficient for Russian ships to enjoy the full benefits of exemp-
tion, considering the nature of marine traffic, commercial interest 
between Japan and Russia, as \Yell as the position of the commercial 
ports in the Far East; consequently the one week's grace was adopted 
by the experienced experts of the Japanese Navy. (International 
Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese \Var, p. 66.) 
Propositions as to delai de faveur at the Second Hague 
Oonference.-There \Vere made at the Second Hague Con-
ference various propositions in regard to the treatment 
of merchant vessels of one belligerent in the ports of the 
other belligerent at the outbreak of hostilities. 
Russia: 
Dans le cas ou un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants serait 
surpris par laguerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, celui-ci doit 
accorder a ce batin1ent un delai suffisant afin de lui permettre: 
D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises 
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter libre-
ment le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine ou un port neutre. · 
Nether lands: 
Le delai sera fixe pour chaque port par les belligerants au commence-
ment de laguerre; il ne pourra etre de moins que de cinq jours. 
1 Seven days \Vere allowed after the date of the ordinance, ten from the beginning of 
the war. 
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This proposition 'vas further elaborated: 
Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes, 
qui, a l'ouverture des hostilites, se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis, 
pourront, a moins que leur chargement ne constitue de la contrebande 
de guerr~, quitter librement le port et gagner en securite le port national 
le plus rapproche ou un port neutre interpose. 
Afin de leur permettre d'achever leur chargement ou leur decharge-
ment, un delai suffisant, a fixer par les autorites locales, leur sera 
accord e. 
France: 
Les navires de commerce ressortissant aux Puissances belligerantes 
qui a l'ouverture des hostilites se trouveraient dans les ports ennemis, 
et auxquels aucun delai de faveur ne serait accorde pour reprendre 
la mer, ne peuvent etre confisques. 
Toutefois la sortie du port peut leur etre refusee et ils sont alors 
sujets a requisition, moyennant indemnite, conformement aux lois 
terri tori ales en vigueur. · 
Dans le cas oi1 un batiment de commerce d'un des belligerants 
serait surpris par la guerre dans un port d'un autre belligerant, il est 
desirable que celui-ci accorde a ce batiment un delai de faveur afin 
de lui permettre: 
D'achever son dechargement, ou le chargement des marchandises 
qui ne constituent pas de contrebande de guerre et de quitter libre-
ment le port et de gagner en securite le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine ou un port neutre. 
Discussion of delai de faveur at the Second Hague Confer-
ence.-The questionnaire submitted by Prof. :\iartens to 
the Second Hague Conference in 1907 contained the 
follo,ving: 
IV. Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouYerture des hostilites, 
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes 
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants? 
V. N e faut-il pas reconnaltre a ces navires le droit de quitter libre-
ment, dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les 
ports de leur sejour au moment du commencement de la guerre? 
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome. III, p. 1133.) 
The Russian opinion upon the general question of 
delai de faveur 'vas in part: 
La pratique et la ~cience ont etabli la procedure ~UiYante , qui est 
en usage depuis la guerre de Crimee. Un delai de faveur suffisant 
doit etre accorde aux navires de commerce des belliRerants, pris a 
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l'improYi~te pur la declaration de guerre dans un port ennemi. Ce 
delai doit etre assez long pour permettre au navire d'achever son 
dechargement ou le churgement des marchandises qui ne constituent 
pas de contrebande de guerre, de quitter librement le port et de gagner, 
avec toutes les garanties de securite, le port le plus rapproche de son 
pays d'origine, ou n'importe quel autre port neutre. 
De meme ne peuvent etre ni captures, ni confisques a titre de prises, 
les navires de commerce de la nation ennemie, qui ont quitte un port 
quelconque avant la declaration de guerre, et qui ignorent le com-
mencement des hostilites, l'ouverture de celles-ci ayant eu lieu lors-
qu'ils se trouvaient en pleine mer. (Ibid., p. 825.) 
The instructions given June 12, 1907, to the British 
delegation to the Second Hague Conference state: 
It has been customary on the outbreak of hostilities for belligerents 
to grant certain days of grace to enemy and neutral ships. In the view 
of His :Majesty's Government the allowance of such an interval before 
the strict rules of hostilities are enforced should, as indeed the term 
"days of grace" implies, be treated purely as a matter of grace and 
favor, and not as one of right, and they are of opinion that any fixed 
rule on the point would be undesirable, as the circumstances of each 
case must necessarily differ. It will be to the general interest of this 
country to maintain the utmost liberty of action in this particular. 
(Correspondence, Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers, 
Misc. No. 1 (1908), p. 16.) 
The British position 'vas thus stated: 
Heureusement a l'heure actuelle il est d'usage d'accorder un tel 
delai aux navires de commerce, mais cet usage n'existe que depuis un 
certain nombre d'annees. II y a de plus le fait incontestable que la 
duree de ce delai~ accorde aux vaisseaux ennemis et neutres, varie 
d'une fa~on considerable selon les circonstances. 
Pendant plus d'une cinquantaine d'annees la Grande-Bretagne a 
toujours accorde ce delai aux navires de commerce dans les cas ou elle 
se trouvait belligerante. En outre elle contin\lera toujours dans cette 
voie, a condition seulement que les operations militaires n'en soient 
pas lesees d'une fa~on serieuse. 
II est evident, cependant, que ce delai est accorde par faveur et 
qu'il n'y existe aucun droit, et de notre maniE~re de voir il ne serait 
jamais possible de formuler une loi internationale qui exigerait d'une 
Puissance belligerante qu'elle accorde un delai de faveur a:l'ouverture 
d 'une guerre sans aucune reserve. 
De ce que vient de dire !'honorable Delegue qui a parle en dernier 
lieu, il nous paralt evident qu'il serait impossible de formuler une 
regie absolue qui donnerait pleine satisfaction a tout le monde en toutes 
circonstances. 
Un delai d'une telle duree qui satisferait les marines marchandes 
de deux Puissances voisines, serait tout a fait insuffisant dans le cas 
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ou les Puissances belligerantes se trouveraient dans de differents 
hemispheres. 
On doit encore envisager le cas d'une Puissance possedant des 
colonies dans les mers lointaines. Un delai de quelques jours qui 
pourra suffire pour les vaisseaux de commerce se trouvant dans ses 
ports metropolitains, ne serait nullement suffisant pour ceux qui se 
trouveraient dans les ports coloniaux. 
De plus, et laissant de cote la question geographique, il y a encore 
un argument non moins fort qui nous porte a demander que la limite 
du delai ne soit pas fixee d'une fa~on absolue. 
On peut imaginer le cas d'une guerre entre deux Puissances, l'une 
possedant une marine marchande tres grande, et l'autre n'ayant pas 
d'interet important dans le commerce sur mer. 
La premiere fera son possible afin de prolonger la duree du delai, 
la seconde, au contraire, voudra commencer aussitot que possible ses 
operations contre la marine marchande de son ennemi. 
Voila quelques facteurs du probleme qui nous est soumis. Pendant 
que ces differences existent, et pendant que le droit de capture et de 
blocus sont de regie, il nous parait raisonnable que chaque Puissance 
se reserve le droit d'agir a ce sujet selon ses interets comme dans le 
passe. 
Neanmoins, nous estimons qu'un belligerant ne doit pas seulement 
donner avis d'un blocus, mais qu'il doit en outre accorder aux vais-
seaux neutres un delai convenable avant d'exercer ses pleins pouvoirs 
contre eux. 
Le Gouvernement britannique juge qu'il sera mieux de ne pas 
etablir des regles fixes qui pourront limiter les droits d'un belligerant 
a cet egard, ce qui n'implique nullement qu'on ne devra pas accorder 
les delais de faveur comme regie generale. 
Bien au contraire, mon Gouvernement a pleine intention d'adherer 
a ce qu'il a fait dans le passe depuis plus de cinquante ans. 
Dans le cas (qui j'espere n'arrivera jamais) ou la Grande-Bretagne 
serait belligerante, elle accorderait aux vaisseaux marchands, tant 
ennemis que neutres, un delai de faveur convenable, sous reserve 
toujours que ce delai ne puisse compromettre ses interets nationaux. 
En un mot, le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne s'associe aux 
sentiments qui ont motive la proposition russe, maiA en meme temps 
nous sommes d'opinion que le delai doit etre considere accorde comme 
un privilege et nullement comme un droit. (Ibid., p. 827 .) 
The Japanese delegate said: 
Quoique le Japon ait toujours accorde un delai de faveur a tous les 
navires et dans tous les ports, la Delegation japonaise estime nean-
moins qu'a l'avenir il n'y aurait pas de raisons suffisantes pour traiter 
les navires des belligerants qui, en temps de paix, sont subsidies par 
le Gouvernement pour etre transformes en instruments de guerre 
offensive, au trement que comme de contrebande mentionnes dans la 
proposition des honorables Delegues de Russie. N ous pensons aussi 
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que la Puissance belligerante doit avoir le droit de prendre les dis-
positions necessaires pour indiquer les ports ou le privilege en question 
sera accorde, ainsi que les limites de la faveur qu'elle a !'intention de 
donner, de fa9on qu'elle puisse accorder aux interesses plus de facilites 
dans un port que dans un autre. N ous estimons ensuite que, des 
stipulations conventionnelles seront etablies ace sujet, il est preferable 
de fixer un delai bien determine que d'indiquer un delai dependant 
de la duree du chargement et du dechargement de la cargaison, ce qui 
femble etre un terme equivoque, puisque dans quelques ports ces 
operations peuvent etre achevees dans deux ou trois jours et, dans 
d'autres, elles peuvent durer des semaines et memes des mois. 
En consequence, tout en acceptant le principe humanitaire qui est 
enonce dans la proposition de la Delegation russe, nous nous rangeons 
en meme temps a l'opinion de nos honorables collegues de la G:r:ande-
Bretagne en l'interpretant comme un privilege accorde par la Puissance 
belligerante, et non comme un droit qui pourrait etre invoque par 
le vaisseau en question. (Ibid.,•p. 828.) 
The course of the discussion is shO\Vll in the resume 
given in the report of the fourth co1nmission, \vhich from 
its significance may be stated fully: 
La troisieme question inscrite au programme de la Quatrieme Com-
mission est celle du "delai de faveur a accorder aux vaisseaux pour quitter 
les ports neutres ou les ports ennemis apres l'ouverture des hostilites." 
C'est, comme on le sait, depuis laguerre de Crimee en 1854 que les 
Etats belligerants ont pris !'habitude,· au debut des hostilites, au lieu 
de confisquer les navires ennemis se trouvant ou entrant dans leurs 
ports, de leur permettre la sortie et meme de leur accorder un certain 
delai pour sortir en securite. 
Le motif de cette mesure, actuellemetit toute facultative, est de 
"'concilier les interets du commerce avec les necessites de laguerre" 
et, meme a pres l'ouverture des hostilites "de proteger encore·, aussi large-
ment que possible, les operations engagees de bonne foi et en cours 
d'execution avant laguerre." 
Cette question a ete soumise a l'examen de la Commission par notre 
President, :\I. de :\Iartens, sous la forme suivante: 
"Est-il de bonne guerre, au moment de l'ouverture des hostilites, 
de saisir et de confisquer les navires marchands ennemis stationnes 
dans les ports de l'un des Etats belligerants?" 
"N e faut-il pas reconnaltre aces navires le droit de quitter librement, 
dans un laps de temps determine, avec ou sans cargaison, les ports de 
leur sejour au moment du commencement de laguerre?" 
Quatre propositions ont ete deposees sur ce sujet: 
La Delegation de Russie a propose de declarer desormais obligatoire 
la concession d'un delai aux batiments de commerce relevant d'une 
des Puissances belligerantes et surpris par la guerre dans les ports 
ennemis, afin de leur permettre d'achever leurs operations commer-
ciales inoffensives et de prendre librement lamer pour gagner en secu-
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rite leur port nationalle plus rapproche ou un port neutre . Le navire 
qui, par suite de force majeure, n'aurait pu profiter de cette faculte, ne 
pourrait etre con:fisque. La proposition russe ajoutait, par un motif 
analogue, que le navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart avant 
laguerre et surpris en mer par le commencement de laguerre, ne pour-
rait etre capture, qu'il pourrait seulement etre retenu et enfin que la 
faveur de ces dispositions devait etre etendue egalement aux navires 
entrant dans les ports ennemis. 
A l'appui de cette proposition, la DelE~gation Imperiale a fait valoir 
d'une part la necessite de sauvegarder, conformement a l'equite, les 
operations de commerce engagees de bonne foi et en tou te confiance 
avant la guerre et d'autre part la pratique universellement suivie 
depuis 1854. 
Quelque equitable qu'apparaisse le principe meme de cette mesure, 
on n'a pas manquee toutefois de faire remarquer combien une regie 
uniformement obligatoire etait pratiquement delicate a fixer et com-
ment la consecration d'une obligation pourrait eventuellement Ieser 
!'interet legitime des belligerants. 
Les navires ennemis, qui se t1~ouvent dans les ports d'un belligerant, 
peuvent, comme on l'a dit, etre des navires susceptibles de servir a la 
guerre; il est difficile, peut-etre impossible, de toujours les distinguer 
d'avance; peut-on alors obl'iger le belligerant a laisser, dans tousles cas, 
sortir de ses ports les navires de commerce ennemis, quels qu'ils soient, 
alors que la faculte de les retenir lui permet de priver son adversaire 
de moyens d'attaque et de defense pouvant bientot etre utilises? 
Pour ces raisons, la Delegation fran~aise a propose le maintien du 
regime facultatif actuel. ~Iais, s'associant pleinement aux sentiments 
d'equite exposes par la Russie, et au legitime souci des interets du 
commerce international, exigeant de ne point tromper la confiance du 
tra:fic engage en temps de paix, la Delegation de la Republique admet-
tait que le navire auquella sortie serait refusee ne saurait etre confisque 
et qu'il serait seulement sujet a requisition, moyennant indemnite, 
comme toutes autres proprietes se trouvant sur le territoire du belli-
gerant. 
La Delegation neerlanclaise, tout en se declarant partisan de !'obli-
gation, proposa un amenclement tendant a y apporter une exception 
pour les navires susceptibles d'etre transformes en batiments de guerre. 
Enfin la Delegation suedoise, dans un but de conciliation, proposa 
de combiner les propositions russe et fran~aise, en se bornant a consacrer 
le caractere desirable de la concession d'un delai. 
La discussion qui a eu lieu au sein de la Commission a ainsi prin-
cipalement porte sur le caractere obligatoire ou facultatif de la mesw·e 
en question. 
Apres avoir constate qu'il y avait unanimite pour considerer la con-
cession d'un delai tout au moins comme desirable, la Commission a 
decide de ne voter qu'apres le travail du Comite d'Examen et elle a 
pense qu'en vue de faciliter u·n accord, il convenait de charger ce 
Comite de rediger un projet prenant en consideration la preoccupation 
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relative aux navires de commerce susceptibles d'etre tran::5fonnes en 
batiments de guerre. 
C'est dans ces conditions que le Comite d'Exa1nen a procede a ses 
deliberations. 
L'accord n'ayant pu se faire sur le principe de I' obligation, le Comite 
a pris comme base de discussion la proposition transactionnelle suedoise, 
qui a abouti a un projet de reglement, dont voici l'economie, et qui, 
sauf certaines reserves, a obtenu, devant la Commission, l'unanimite 
moins deux abstent.ions. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de Ia 
Paix, Tome I, p. 250.) 
As a result of discussion there "\vas elaborated by the 
drafting com1nittee the follo,ving rule: 
Lorsqu'un navire de commerce relevant d'une des Puissances bellige-
rantes se trouve au debut des hostilites dans un port ennemi, il est 
desirable qu'il lui soit permis de sortir librement, immediatement ou 
apres un delai suffisant, et de gagner directement, apres avoir ete muni 
d'un laisser-passer, son port de destination ou tel autre port qui lui 
sera designe. · 
II en est de meme du navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart 
avant le commencement de Ia guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi 
dans !'ignorance des hostilites. 
The "\vord desirable is used to indicate the degree of 
obligation resting upon the belligerent, as Great Britain 
at the Conference \Vas particularly opposed to making the 
grant of delay a duty of the belligerent. 
The British delegation proposed the insertion of the 
words de faveur after the "\Vord delai. (For the several 
propositions see Deuxieme Conference Internationale de 
la Paix, Tome III, pp. 1150-1154.) 
Thus there "\vas evolved at the Second Hague Confer-
ence in 1907 a rule less stringent than the practice "\vhich 
had been recognized by the United States as generally 
obligatory. 
The Convention relative to the Status of Enemy :Wier-
chant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities according to 
the introductory clause "\Vas agreed upon by States 
"anxious to insure the security of international com-
merce against the surprises of "\var and "\Yishing, in 
accordance "\vith modern practice, to protect as far as 
possible operations undertaken in good faith and 1n 
process of being carried out before the outbreak of 
hostilities." 
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Report of the American delegation.-The report of the 
American delegation emphasized the grounds upon 
which the attitude of the United States was maintained. 
The uninterrupted practice of belligerent powers since the out-
break of the Crimean war has been to allow enemy merchant vessels 
in their ports at the outbreak of hostilities to depart on their return voyages. 
The same privilege has been accorded to enemy merchant vessels 
which sailed before the outbreak of hostilities, to ·enter and depart from 
a belligerent port without molestation on the homeward voyage. It 
was therefore the view of the American delegation that the privilege 
had acquired such international force as to place it in the category of 
obligations. Such, indeed, was the view of a majority of the Confer-
ence, but as the delegation of Great Britain adhered to the opinion that 
such free entry and departure was a matter of grace, or favor, and not 
one of strict right, the articles regard it as a delay by way of favor and 
refer to the practice as desirable. 
In support of the American view the case of the Buena Ventura is in 
point. This case was decided in 1899, and in his opinion Justice Peck: 
ham says: 
"It being plain that merchant vessels of the enemy carrying on inno-
cent commercial enterprises at the time or just prior to the time when 
hostilities between the two countries broke out would, in accordance 
with the later practice of civilized nations, be the subject of liberal 
treatment by the Executive, it is necessary when his proclamation has 
been issued, which lays down rules for treatment of merchant vessels, 
to put upon the words used therein the most liberal and extensive 
interpretation of which they are capable; and where there are two or 
more interpretations which possibly might be put upon the language 
the one that will be most favorable to the belligerent party, in whose 
favor the proclamation is issued, ought to be adopted. 
"This is the doctrine of the English courts, as exemplified in The 
Phcenix (Spink's Prize Cases, 1, 5) and The Argo (Id., p. 52). It is the 
doctrine .which this court believes to be proper and correct. The 
Buena Ventura (175 U. S., 388)." 
At the first reading, the Convention seems to confer a privilege upon 
enemy ships at the outbreak of war. Free entry and departure are 
provided for, ships are not to be molested on their return voyages, and 
a general immunity from capture is granted to vessels from their last port 
of departure, whether hostile or neutral. But all these immunities 
are conditioned upon ignorance of the existence of hostilities on the 
part of the ship. This condition forms no part of the existing practice, 
and it was the opinion of the delegation that it substantially neutralized 
the apparent benefits of the treaty and puts merchant shipping in a 
much less favorable situation than is accorded to it by the international 
practice of the last fifty years .. 
An enemy merchant v~ssel approaching a hostile port which is 
notified by an armed cruiser, or which obtains the information under 
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circumstances calculated to charge it with knowledge of the fact that 
hostilities exist, forfeits the immunities conferred by the treaty and 
becomes, eo instante, liable to capture. As the freight trade of the 
world is carried on in steamers which habitually carry only enough 
coal to reach their destination, the operation of the treaty is to render 
them instantly liable to capture, the alternative being to continue to 
the hostile destination and surrender. 
The Convention operates powerfully in favor of a State having a 
predominant naYal force and possessed of numerous ports throughout 
the world so situated that a merchant Yessel carrying its flag may take 
refuge in such ports on being notified that hostilities exist. All other 
powers would be placed in a position of great disadvantage, and their 
merchant marine would suffer incalculable injury as the result of its 
adoption. 
The effects upon the practice of marine insurance are also important. 
The ordinary contract does not coYer a war risk. The operation of a 
war risk is simple because its conditions and incidents are fully known. 
But a policy calculated to cover the contingency of capture, the risk 
depending upon the chance or possibility of notification, would intro-
duce an element of uncertainty into marine risks which, in view of the 
interests at stake, should not be encouraged. 
The Convention also presents an undesirable alternative in the 
t reatment of enemy merchant ships, in that it provides that in certain 
cases they may be seized "subject to restoration after the war without 
indemnity," or to "immediate requisition with indemnity." As 
merchant marine commerce is carried on it is obvious that the condi-
tion of the cargo which is detained in indifferent or inefficient custo-
dianship during the ordinary duration of war would approach confis-
cation. It would also be substantially impossible to make such a risk 
the subject of a practicable contract of insurance. 
The foregoing ConYention was not signed by the delegation, and its 
acceptanc.;e as a conYentional obligation is not recommended. (S. Doc. 
~o. 444, GOth Cong., 1st sess., p. 38.) 
'rhis IIague Convention, relative to the Status of 
Enemy :Jierchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities 
has not been adhered to by the United States. 
Sumrnary.-\\"'"hether 48 hours is a reasonable period to 
allo'v to belligerent Inerchant vessels to load and depart 
'vill depend upon many circtnnstances. The relative 
distance of the ene1ny ports fro1n one another, the nature 
of the co1nmerce bet,veen the ports, the character of the 
yessels, strategic reasons, and other circun1stances may 
influent£' a state in deter1nining the nu1nber of days of 
gTaC'(' . 
CONCLUSIONS. 77 
The discussion at The Hague in 1907 sho\ved that th~ 
States \Vere not \villing to bind themselves to any fi.xed 
period of delay to be allo\ved to merchant vessels in an 
enemy port and that the rule as adopted did not determine 
even that any period should be allo\ved, though it is as-
serted that it is desirable that a suffici~nt period bP 
granted. 
Prof. Higgins says of the rule of the Hague Conference 
relating to the days of grace: 
The practice of granting of days of grace remains therefore as it was 
before the Conference. The powers have recognized its desirability, 
but no merchant ship can demand it, nor will there be a legal ground of 
complaint if all enemy merchant ships within a belligerent's ports at 
the outbreak of war are ordered to leave immediately or after a "suffi-
cient" period. \\Thether the expression "It is desirable" will be con-
sidered as equivalent to a command remains to be seen. States will 
probably act in the future as they have acted in the past. Capt. Ottley 
stated that the British Government had every intention of adhering to 
the practice which it had observed during the past 50 years in granting 
days of grace, subject always to the reservation that the time allowed 
should not compromise its national interests. It was doubtless with a 
similar mental reservation that the other powers accepted this article. 
States will in the future as in the past consult their own interests in 
this matter, but their interests may not infrequently involve a con-
sideration for the interests of neutrals. Each State will determine for 
itself whether the desire to injure its enemy by detaining his merchant 
ships, which might be of the greatest value as auxiliary ships for the 
fleet, will ''prevail over the fear of offending neutrals by causing a 
great dislocation of trade in which some of them are sure to be inter-
ested." (The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 303.) 
Conclusions (a) It 'vould seem from the current rules 
and opinion that 48 hours might under certain circum-
stances be a sufficient period and under present rules State 
X could properly limit the delai de faveur to a period of 
48 hours. 
(b) As the allo\vance of days of grace is a favor rather 
than obligatory under present rules, a favor n1ay be 
\vithdra\vn. Certainly a favor granted by one belligerent 
to the other ought not to be taken advantage of to the 
detriment of the belligerent granting the favor. In the 
situation under consideration State Y should certainly 
be allowed to shorten the period already proclaimed to 
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corre::;ponJ \vith that granted by State X to the vessels 
of State lr. 
(c) 'fo \vithdra\v all delai de faveur \Vould involve the 
good faith of Y, as the Yessels of State X had doubtless 
governed their action by the proclamation of State Y. 
To co1npel departure \vithin 48 hours \Vould be a hard-
ship, but \Vould still allo\v the vessels to depart and 
\Vould be an adequate measure· to meet the action of 
State X in lin1iting the delai de faveur to 48 hours and 
could be justified on the ground of retaliation. 
To \vithdra\V all d{lai de faveur after once announcing 
that delai \vould be allow·ed \Vould closely approach 
perfidy, \vhich is generally regarded as prohibited in \var. 
\Vhile it \Vould be possible for a State to refrain from 
the grant of any specific delai de faveur, it \vould not be 
justifiable for a State to proclaim a delai and later \vith-
dra\V all delai. '" · 
State Y has not the right under the conditions stated 
to ,vithdra\v all delai de faveur, but may in an 
extreme case allo\v the vessels to depart freely but 
"immediately." 
SOLUTIOX. 
(a) Under certain circumstances 48 hours may be a 
reasonable limit for delai de faveur. 
(b) State Y, if it deems such action expedient, should 
be allo,ved to shorten the period \vhich it has already 
p; oclaimecl to correspond 'vith the period granted by 
State X. 
(c) Under the conditions proposed· in Situation III, 
and having regard to the preamble of the Hague Con-
vention on this subject, State Y has not the right to \vith-
draw all delai de faveur, though in an extreme case it 
1nay adopt the alternative of ·the Convention, \vhich 
requires enemy vessels to depart "immediately." 
